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ABSTRACT
BELLING THE CAT: THE NEO-TALIBAN INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN
by
Andrew R. Smith
University of New Hampshire, December, 2011
It has been over a decade since the United States and its allies invaded
Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom. Today, Afghanistan and the Taliban are
at the forefront of US foreign policy. This thesis aims to define the Taliban movement in
Afghanistan, from past to present, and asks why they still exist as a political movement
after a decade of war and counterinsurgency efforts. It discusses the rise of both the
Taliban and the neo-Taliban and observes their differences and similarities.
Subsequently, using Cornelia Beyer's "Synthetic Approach," the Taliban insurgency and
US-led counterinsurgency efforts are analyzed. The Synthetic Approach allows the
opportunity to look at the Afghan insurgency using multiple variables from an
international perspective. The Taliban's tactics, edicts, and geopolitical space are dynamic
and constantly shifting. This thesis employs an equally dynamic theoretical framework
with which to trace the Taliban and explain their resilient nature.

1

INTRODUCTION
The basic concept of power is the ability to influence others to get them to do
what you want. There are three major ways to do that: one is to threaten them
with sticks; the second is to pay them with carrots; the third is to attract them or
co-opt them, so that they want what you want. If you can get others to be
attracted, to want what you want, it costs you much less in carrots and sticks.
- Joseph Nye

After almost a decade of military and political involvement in Afghanistan, the
United States and its NATO allies continue struggling to eliminate the "neo-Taliban"
insurgency. Today's military clashes with the Taliban and predictions of never-ending
conflict within Afghanistan are stark contrasts to the public declarations of military and
government leaders in 2005, who stated: "the Taliban is a force in decline;" "US military
estimates suggest there may be only 800 Taliban fighters left;" and that "Peaceful
elections are a sign that the Taliban are disorganized, weak, and on the run."1
Public and private sector analysts, researchers, journalists, politicians, and pundits
are constantly trying to explain the variables which allow the Taliban to continuously
combat Western forces, attract recruits, and retain territorial and ideological footholds
within Afghanistan. With Osama bin-Laden dead, relations with Pakistan colder than
ever, and cooperation with President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan government faltering;
the United States and its NATO allies are desperately looking to adopt an effective
strategy which can eliminate the major threats of the neo-Taliban insurgency and
facilitate the establishment of a stable Afghanistan able to govern and protect itself. In

Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 1.

2

reality, no one expects that Afghanistan will be wholly at peace when NATO troops
withdraw, nor that the Taliban insurgency will have been routed.2 On June 22nd,
President Obama announced that America will begin drawing down its troops in
Afghanistan in July 2011, effectively marking the end of the troop "surge" which began
in late 2009.3 However, for many Americans worried about troubles at home and the
ineffectiveness of political and military strategy in Afghanistan, the essential question is:
Why is the United States still fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan after removing them
from power over a decade ago and investing billions of dollars in resources and man
power to stabilize the country?4
Research on the Taliban, the neo-Taliban and the Afghan insurgency continues to
develop as events and information regarding the war unfold. The complexity of
Afghanistan and the region cannot be encompassed in one study or understood through a
single perspective. The neo-Taliban insurgency is a regional insurgency, with military
and ideological roots dating back to the Cold War. This analysis builds on the developing
field of Taliban and neo-Taliban research by applying an analytical framework that uses a
synthesis of realist and constructivist ideas in order to provide an international
perspective on the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The analysis proposes an
international perspective which applies the ideas of power, polarity, equilibrium,
hegemony, and the mutuality of both ideas and material facts to the Taliban and Afghan
insurgency in order to help explain the complex dynamics underlying the ongoing

2

"Neither a picnic nor a Switzerland," The Economist, June 23, 2011, 56.

3

The Economist, "Neither a picnic nor a Switzerland," 56.

4

For U.S. foreign assistance breakdown and totals, see CRS Report: Tarnoff, Curt. "Afghanistan: U.S.
Foreign Assistance" Congressional Research Service. August 12, 2010.

3

conflict and provide a better understanding of the variables which prevent an easy peace
in the country and the region.
The analysis begins in Chapter 1 with a history of the Taliban in Afghanistan,
tracing their ideological and developmental roots beginning with the Mujahedeen fighters
of the Soviet-Afghan war and ending with the inception of the neo-Taliban insurgency of
today. Chapter 2 is a review of Taliban and neo-Taliban literature. The literature is
separated into three categories by level of analysis, starting with the individual and
leading to the state and regional levels. This chapter also introduces the synthetic
framework laid out by Cornelia Beyer and explains how her approach will be adapted to
the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Chapter 3 focuses on applying the synthetic
approach to Afghanistan. The chapter combines various ideas from the paradigms of
realism and constructivism in order to better understand the roles that state and non-state
actors play in Afghanistan. Uni-multipolarity, power equilibrium, hegemony, and tit-fortat are some of the ideas used to help analyze major variables of the Afghan insurgency,
such as state corruption, insurgency/counterinsurgency strategy, and the relationships
between state and sub-state actors in Afghanistan and the region. Chapter 4 concludes the
analysis with a summary of the important power dynamics identified in the analysis. With
the help of Joseph Nye's three-dimensional chess game, the chapter finishes by reflecting
on the United States' search for balance in Afghanistan between material and ideational
powers.

4
CHAPTER I
HISTORY OF THE TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN

The Taliban are an Islamic-fundamentalist group which controlled the majority of
Afghanistan from 1997 to 2001. Since their emergence after the Soviet-Afghan war, the
Taliban have played many different roles. The Taliban began as a revolutionary
grassroots movement, and eventually became the recognized government of the state of
Afghanistan. The Taliban were removed from power by the United States and its allies
during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. Today the Taliban have become an integral
part of the Afghan insurgency. There are few constants which accurately describe the
Taliban throughout their modern history. Their leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar rarely
appears in public or meets with media, furthering the mysticism and conjecture regarding
the structure of the Taliban leadership and their administrative methods. Outlining the
complex history of the Taliban and the actors involved is essential for understanding why
they continue to function as an insurgent group in Afghanistan and why their ideology
has remained popular among rural and tribal Afghans despite the counterinsurgency
efforts of NATO forces currently in Afghanistan.
The Taliban: From Mujahedeen to Political Movement:
The structural and ideological roots of the Taliban began with the Mujahedeen
during the Soviet-Afghan war. Any Afghan who took up arms against occupying Soviet
forces and engaged in jihad were, "in the true sense, Mujahidin, or fighters in a holy war.
Mujahedeen parties assigned their own leaders at the local level and some of these rose to

prominence."5 The Mujahedeen were a complex group of Islamic jihadists controlled by
various military leaders from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Seven of the
most influential groups comprising the Mujahedeen were eventually recognized by the
Pakistani government and receive major financial aid and military hardware in order to
fight the Russian military.6 These influential groups of Mujahedeen fighters were:
Jamiat-i-Islami, Hisb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hisb-e-Islami led by Younis
Khalis, Ittihad-i-Islami, the Afghan National Liberation Front, Harakat-i-Inqilab-iIslami, and Mahaz-i-Milli-i-Islami.7
Table I 8
Major Mujahedeen Groups After the Soviet Afghan War.
Group Name
Jamiat-i-Islami

Leader(s)

Ideological
Orientation
Islamist

Ethnic
Orientation
Tajik

Islamist

Pushtun

Islamist (Deoband)

N/A

Hisb-e-Islami

Burhannudin
Rabbani.
Ahmed Shah Masoud
Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar
Younis Khalis

Ittihad-i-Islami

Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf

Islamist (Wahabbi)

N/A

Afghan National
Liberation Front
Harakat-i-Inqilab-iIslami

Sibghatullah
Mujadidi
Nabi Muhammadi

Afghan Traditionalist

Pushtun

Afghan Traditionalist

N/A

Hisb-e-Islami

5

Peter Marsden, The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2002), 26.

6

Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 28. and Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and
Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press, 2010), 18.
7

8

Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 29-32.

Data Source: Marsden, Peter. The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan. New York: Zed Books Ltd,
2002.

Mahaz-i-Milli-iIslami
Junbish-i Milli-yi
Islami

PirGailani

Moderate

Pushtun

Rashid Dostum

Militant

Uzbek

In the early 1980's, each of the seven major Mujahedeen groups received official
recognition as Pakistan selected and funded specific resistance groups to fight against
Russian forces in Afghanistan.9
Islamist leaders that were previously unknown now found access to international
assistance through the ISI1 and were able to form extensive networks of armed
political organizations. They were given free reign over millions of Afghans who
were living in refugee camps in Pakistan, and the assistance they received was
used to recruit and influence the refugee populations. Their connections with the
Islamists in Pakistan allowed them to build bridges with other Islamists and
conservative groups in North Africa, the Middle East, and North America,
energizing the flow of activists and resources to Afghanistan as well as
throughout the larger network of Islamists around the world.11
Prior to the Soviet-Afghan war, Islamists barely had a base of influence in Afghan
society. However, with the majority of war funds and arms distributed to Islamist groups
such as Hizb-e-Islami led by Hekmatyar and Jamiat-e-Islami led by Burhannudin
Rabbani; they were able to build highly centralized, political organizations which wielded
"tremendous clout" by the end of the war.12
However, each Mujahedeen group was not built on the same ideology, ethnicity,
or with the same goals in mind. These differences only began to play a major role after
the end of the Soviet-Afghan war. Four of the major Mujahedeen parties defined
themselves as Islamist: seeking to create a political movement with an ideological base
9

Neamatollah Nojumi, "The Rise and Fall of the Taliban," in The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan,
ed. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 91.
10

The ISI is Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence Agency

11

Nojumi, "The Rise and Fall," 92.

12

Rashid, Taliban, 19.
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that drew on reinterpretation of the essential elements of Islam.13 The remaining
Mujahedeen groups defined themselves as traditionalists: "they emerged from traditional
tribal or other groupings within Afghanistan."14 The various tribal, ethnic, and ideological
differences among Mujahedeen groups would not lead to significant conflict during the
war. At the time, the Mujahedeen militant groups and commanders were united by a
common goal to resist the imposition of Russian communism and the destruction of both
tribal and Islamic ways of life. Additionally, abundant and continuous financial and
military aid from foreign governments and beneficiaries eliminated the need for
competition among Mujahedeen parties for resources.15 However, the withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 would pit former Mujahedeen parties against one
another in a struggle to control territory and find alternative sources of income.
Before withdrawing from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union established a puppet
government under the control of Muhammad Najibullah. Through foreign financial
support, the Soviet Union was able to keep Najibullah in power after their military
withdrew. Najibullah's regime managed to control most of the major urban areas in
Afghanistan while Mujahedeen factions fought over control of rural and tribal areas.1
Until 1992, Najibullah controlled Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar, Herat, and
Jalalabad.17 Najibullah fell from power when his most prominent militia leader, Rashid

13

Marsden , War and Religion in Afghanistan, 28.

14

Ibid., 19.

15

Ahmed Rashid's research indicates that the Mujahedeen received a total of over ten billion dollars, most
in the form of weaponry, from the combined contributions of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and
other European and Islamic countries.
1

Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 36.
Ibid., 35.

8

Dostam, deserted and joined forces with Burhannudin Rabbani, the leader of the
Mujahedeen group Jamiat-e-Islami, setting the stage for "the armed but peaceful entry of
the Mujahedeen into Kabul on April 25th, 1992."18 However, the capture of Kabul by new
leaders would result in further fractionalization among Mujahedeen and ex-Mujahedeen
forces as each vied for power.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of one faction of Hisb-e-Islami became angry,
arguing that he had been cheated on the power-sharing deal between himself, Rabanni
and Dostam regarding the capture of Kabul. In order to assert himself and the power of
Hisb-e-Islami in Kabul, Hekmatyar provoked a civil war, shelling Kabul in an attempt to
delegitimize Rabbani and gain power. By 1994 Afghanistan and Kabul were in a state of
virtual disintegration after fifteen years of war. Rashid's analysis shows that
Afghanistan "was divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords had fought,
switched sides and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and
bloodshed."21 Northern Afghanistan was controlled by Dostum, who had subsequently
broken his alliance with Rabbani. Rabbani controlled Kabul and northeast Afghanistan.
Herat was under the control of another warlord, Ismael Khan. Mujahedeen commanders
based in Jalalabad controlled the eastern border provinces. Finally, southern Afghanistan
was controlled by "dozens of petty ex-Mujahedeen warlords and bandits who plundered
the population at will."22 By the mid 90's, Afghanistan was in a state of chaos and

18

Rashid, Taliban, 21. and Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 37.

1

Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 37.

20

Rashid, Taliban, 21.

21

Ibid., 21.

22

Ibid., 21.

9
borderline anarchy. The stage was set for any domestic group with enough political and
material resources to force their way into a position of power.
It is also important to note the absence of international relations with Afghanistan
after the end of the Soviet-Afghan war and leading up to the Taliban's run for power.
Afghanistan failed to register at the international level in the early nineties.23 Barnett
Rubin's research on Afghanistan points out that "The U.N., the U.S., and Russia
abandoned efforts at conflict resolution in the country after April 1992, and the regional
powers stepped into the breach."24 The UN's humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan were
limited by danger and the security of personnel, lack of government, and failure of world
powers to fund most of the programs it did propose.25 Political turmoil within
Afghanistan was largely ignored by the international community and left to be resolved
by the various warlords and factions waging civil war within the country. The
governments of Central Asia, as well as Russia, expressed concern about the spread of
weapons, disorder, and extremist Islamic movements from Afghanistan during the
nineties. Unfortunately, the international climate was not focused on Afghanistan or
central Asia and no significant steps were taken to bring the country under control.
The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan:
While warring fiefdoms throughout Afghanistan continued to harass one another
for control of cities and provinces; groups of Mujahedeen and ex-Mujahedeen who had
fought the Najibullah regime began re-convening to discuss possible resolutions to
23

Barnett R. Rubin "Afghanistan in 1993: Abandoned but Surviving," Asian Survey 34 (1994): 190,
accessed June 20, 2011, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645121.
24

Rubin, "Afghanistan in 1993," 190.

10
ending the violence. Ahmed Rashid concisely summarizes the inception of the Taliban as
a group in his analysis:
After much discussion these divergent but deeply concerned groups chalked out
an agenda which still remains the Taliban's declared aims - restore peace, disarm
the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character
of Afghanistan. As most of them were part-time or full-time students at
madrassas, the name they chose for themselves was natural. A talib is an Islamic
student, one who seeks knowledge compared to the mullah who is one who gives
knowledge. By choosing such a name the Taliban (plural of Talib) distanced
themselves from the party politics of the Mujahedeen and signaled that they were
97

a movement for cleansing society rather than a party trying to grab power.
The Afghans who united under the mission of the Taliban chose Mullah Mohammed
Omar as their leader and quickly began to assert their dominance over the various
warlords and factions fighting for the control of Southern Afghanistan.
To outsiders, the Taliban seemed to appear out of nowhere when they first came
to the world's notice in 1994.28 The Taliban's first military conquests were over
roadblocks, checkpoints, and small garrisons run by bandits and mercenaries along the
main roads of Southern Afghanistan. The specific events which catalyzed Mullah Omar's
mobilization of a small group of Taliban to combat better equipped Kandahar warlords
are subject to "an entire factory of myths and stories."29 However, what is certain is that
the Taliban's initial successes helped Omar emerged as a "Robin Hood figure, helping
the poor against the rapacious commanders."30 The Taliban's reputation as righteous,
heroic protectors of rural and tribal populations spread like wildfire throughout Southern
Afghanistan.
27

Rashid, Taliban, 22-23.

28

Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 44.

29

Rashid, Taliban, 25.
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Following their initial victories in the countryside, the Taliban advanced on
Kandahar and took the city with almost no resistance. The Taliban announced to the city
that it was their mission to free Afghanistan of its corrupt leadership and create an
Islamic society.31 They began issuing decrees requiring men to wear turbans, beards,
short hair, shalwar kameez2 and for women to wear the burqa?3 Women were banned
from working and from attending school. Further decrees banned music, games, radio
and television. Regardless of their strict codes, the Taliban's ability to bring order to
Kandahar after two years of virtual anarchy earned them considerable popularity among
the population. The Taliban's popular support, combined with their distinctive white
turbans and obvious religious fervor and purity, lent them an almost supernatural aura.34
As the Taliban's reputation preceded their advances Westward from Kandahar, they
continued to meet little resistance from the armed groups and bandits who had previously
controlled the areas.35
After establishing a base of operations in Kandahar, the Taliban quickly found an
ally in President Rabbani who still had control of Kabul. Rabbani promised to help the
Taliban with funds if they opposed Hekmatyar, who was relentlessly laying siege to the
city. The Taliban also bolstered their armaments and numbers by seizing abandoned
weaponry and encouraging local people to join the ranks of their fighters.

Early support

Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 45.
32

Traditional dress worn by both men and women in South Asia and Central Asia, composed of loose
fitting trousers and a long shirt or tunic.
Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 45.
34

Ibid.

35

Ibid.
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for the Taliban also came from Islamic fundamentalist groups in Pakistan. Many high
ranking Taliban officials had grown up and studied in madrassas run by extremist groups
such as Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) while living in Pakistani refugee camps during the
war.37 Old ties to fundamental madrassas throughout the refugee areas of Pakistan would
be the major source of the Taliban's military manpower as they continued to advance
through Afghanistan.38 By December 1994, some 12,000 Afghan and Pakistani students
had joined the Taliban in Kandahar.39
On September 5th, 1995 the Taliban captured Herat from Ismail Khan's forces.
They set about implementing the same edicts and laws they had in Kandahar, this time to
the chagrin of the local population. On September 1 l l , 1996 the Taliban marched into
Jalalabad and on the 26th they successfully captured Kabul.40 Within days the Taliban
moved north and began engaging Dostam's forces in order to capture the remaining
provinces of Afghanistan. Pakistan recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government
of Afghanistan in early 1997. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates followed
Pakistan's example and officially recognized the Taliban as well.41 To consolidate their
leadership role, the Taliban renamed the country the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
However, the Taliban's extremely oppressive religious edicts began to take their toll
economically, mentally, and socially on the newly acquired cities of Herat and Kabul

36

Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 45.

37

Rashid, Taliban, 26.

38

Ibid.

39

Ibid., 29.

40

Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 48.

41

Ibid., 52.
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The Taliban leaders were all from the poorest, most conservative and least literate
Southern Pashtun provinces of Afghanistan.42 In Mullah Omar's village: "Women had
always gone around fully veiled and no girl had ever gone to school because there were
none."43 Omar and his colleagues transposed their own "milieu," their own experience, or
lack of it, with women, education, and culture to the entire country and justified their
policies through the Koran.44 The forceful, extremist dominion that the Taliban created in
diverse, modernizing cities such as Herat and Kabul ignored centuries of cultural
tradition and development. The majority of Afghanistan was not even remotely like the
south, where the Taliban originated.45 Afghan Pashtuns in the east were proud to send
their girls to school, forty percent of Kabul women worked, Herat's female elite spoke
French as a second language; Afghans went to the movies, played sports, and danced and
sang at weddings.46 The new Taliabn rulers viewed all these activities as signs of iniquity
and saw "northerners" as impure Muslims who had to be forcibly re-Islamicized.47
In stark contrast to the Taliban's early image as liberators, their oppressive rule
changed the perceptions of citizens. Afghans began to see the Taliban as a type of hostile
occupier in major cities. Within twenty-four hours of taking Kabul, all women were
banned from work, girl's schools and colleges were shut down, and new dress codes were

42

Rashid, Taliban, 110.

43

Ibid.

44

Ibid.

45

Ibid.

46

Ibid.

47

Ibid., 111.
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imposed. Once again, the Taliban banned TV, videos, satellite dishes, music and all
games including chess, football and kite-flying.48
The Taliban set up a six-man Shura to rule Kabul, which was dominated by
Durrani Pashtuns and did not include a single Kabuli[.. .]None of the Shura
members had ever lived in a large city, most had never even visited Kabul, but
they were now running a vibrant, semi-modern, multi-ethnic city of 1.2 million
people in which Pashtuns were only a small minority.49
For all intents and purposes, Kabul was treated as an occupied city by the Taliban in
order to force their beliefs among the population and create their version of an ideal,
Islamic state.
For the first time in Afghanistan's history, the Taliban began to institutionalize
Islamism in a top to bottom process within the state bureaucracy and society at large.50
However, during the Taliban's reign they were never able to make the transition from
popular movement to effective state government. The Taliban, like many other popular
revolutionary movements, "failed to differentiate between running a popular militaristic
movement and administering a functioning state."51 The inability of Taliban leadership to
bridge the political gap between themselves and the people they governed would further
seclude the Taliban within their own ideology and leave them disconnected from the
domestic and international affairs of the Afghan state.
Key Taliban leaders were expected to play both civil and military roles due to
constant fighting on multiple fronts. Even with control over the majority of Afghan
provinces, the Taliban had to spend most of its time and resources fighting the Northern

48

Rashid, Taliban, 50.

49

Ibid., 51.

50

Nojumi, "The Rise and Fall," 108.

51

Ibid., 109.

15
Alliance, comprised of Dostum, Ahmad Shah Masud, and various smaller resistance
groups still functioning in Northern Afghanistan.52 Bureaucratic roles were often ignored
for military ones, further isolating the Taliban leadership from the masses. As a result, the
Taliban relied on controlling the Afghan people in cities and urban areas through a
CO

framework of "black versus white, virtue versus vice, Islamic versus un-Islamic." In the
absence of bureaucratic and managerial skills, the Taliban relied on their idea of
"puritanical morality" when formulating and implementing public policy.54 The Taliban's
Islamic or un-Islamic, black and white approach to governance resulted in the absence of
any public services or significant reconstruction projects.
While the Taliban brought relative stability to a country embroiled in civil war
and chaos since 1992, they were unable to sustain the administrative and bureaucratic
elements necessary for a transitional government to be effective. When it came to the
military conquest of Afghanistan, the Taliban established and executed a long-term plan
in order to achieve their goals. However, much more sensitive questions regarding how
the Taliban planned to rule Afghanistan and what they planned for the country's
economic and social development were to remain permanently unanswered - even after
the capture of Kabul.55
al-Oaeda and the Fall of the Taliban:
The Taliban's protracted war against the Northern Alliance resulted in a large
number of casualties and high consumption of resources. "The continued resistance of the
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Northern Alliance, combined with financial difficulties due to UN and U.S. embargos,
made the Taliban desperate to produce human and capital resources."56 The Taliban
relied heavily on drug trafficking between Afghanistan and Pakistan for revenue and
weapons. By 1997, ninety-six per cent of Afghan heroin came from areas under Taliban
control.57 Taxes on opium exports were the sole source of income fueling the Taliban's
war economy. "In 1995 UNDCP estimated that Pakistan-Afghanistan drugs exports were
earning some 50 billion rupees (US$1.35 billion) a year. By 1998 heroin exports had
doubled in value to US$3billion."58
For human resources, the Taliban found adequate supply from Osama Bin Laden
and al-Qaeda. In 1996, Bin Laden and the base of al-Qaeda operations were expelled
from Khartoum, Sudan under pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia. Bin
Laden returned to Afghanistan just as the Taliban had consolidated power over the
majority of country. With the support of the Taliban, al-Qaeda grew to approximately
5,000 members. Bin Laden himself became quite popular with the Taliban leadership
and took pains to make sure he stayed in their good graces.60 Bin Laden paid for the
construction of houses for Mullah Omar's family and other top Taliban leaders, provided
funds for Taliban military equipment, and lent his own forces to fight alongside the
Taliban in their continuing campaign against the Northern Alliance.61 Al-Qaeda's
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military units were put on the front lines against Masud and the Northern Alliance. As
fighting continued, the Taliban became more dependent on al-Qaeda's military and
financial support.62 According to Nojumi, "By the end of 2000, al-Qaeda contributed
around 30 percent to 40 percent of the Taliban's core military forces."63 Al-Qaeda's
contributions to the Taliban military and the popularity of Bin Laden's international
Islamist rhetoric made him a pivotal actor responsible for the Taliban's continued
military success against the Northern Alliance.
Bin Laden's relationship with top Taliban leaders eventually began to influence
their policymaking. Until Bin Laden's arrival, the Taliban leadership were not
particularly antagonistic to the United States or the West.64 However, with the prodding
of Bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the Taliban became increasingly vociferous against the
United States, the UN, Saudi Arabia and Muslim regimes around the world.65 Their
statements increasingly reflected the "world view" and language of defiance that
characterized Bin Laden and al-Qaeda.66 As the Taliban became more antagonistic
through the persuasion of Bin Laden, the United States put pressure on the Taliban to
have Bin Laden expelled. Unfortunately, the State Department and Mullah Omar were
unable to come to terms on an agreement for Bin Laden's expulsion from Afghanistan,
sending Bin Laden into hiding with the help of the Taliban in 1999.
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After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, U.S. led coalition forces, along
with the Northern Alliance, launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
President George W. Bush stated that the intent of the operation was "to disrupt the use
of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations" and bring terrorists to justice.

General

Tommy Franks, commander of military operations in Afghanistan, stated that the central
mission in Operation Enduring Freedom was "the destruction of the al-Qaeda terrorist
network and the removal of the Taliban leadership." By December, coalition forces
controlled all major cities in Afghanistan including Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and
Kabul. Soon after the military successes of coalition forces, the political and
administrative structure of a post-Taliban Afghanistan was mapped out in Bonn,
Germany. In what became known as the Bonn Agreement, various anti-Taliban Afghan
groups met under UN auspices and agreed to convene an emergency Loya Jirga (grand
assembly) by June 2002 to decide the electoral and constitutional proceedings of the
country.70 Sixteen hundred delegates from around Afghanistan assembled and elected
Hamid Karzai as their president. By December 2003, delegates of a Constitutional Loya
Jirga approved a new constitution and opened the way for presidential election in October
2004.71
The Taliban Resurgence and the "neo-Taliban":
After the initial successes of coalition forces in Afghanistan, and the ensuing
political agreements laid out in Bonn; it seemed as if the Taliban and al-Qaeda were
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vanquished within the blink of an eye and order would begin to be restored to a country
embroiled in war and chaos since the Soviet invasion in 1979. However, the Taliban
would prove to be more resilient than anticipated and began to regroup and consolidate
their leadership within the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan as early as 2002. By
2003, US estimates of insurgent Taliban fighters within Afghanistan ranged around
1,000, a figure which expanded to 2-3,000 by 2004 and 3-4,000 by 2006.72 While exact
numbers of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan are difficult to pin down due to
seasonal mobilization of "part-time" fighters and varying rates of movement across
borders, research estimates that Taliban insurgents numbered approximately 17,000 by
2006.73
After the invasion of coalition forces, the Taliban found refuge and were able to
regroup in the same areas of Pakistan where they originally lived as refugees during the
Soviet-Afghan war. Still controlled by the JUI - the same party that helped launch the
Taliban in 1994 - the border provinces of Pakistan served as the epicenter for the
resurgence of the Taliban.74
Mullah Omar, who had been hiding out in Helmand province, arrived in Quetta,
Pakistan in the winter of 2002. Taking key figures from the former regime to
create a new Taliban Shura, Omar appointed four commanders to reorganize
resistance in the four southern provinces of Afghanistan (Uruzgan, Helmand,
Kandahar and Zabul).75
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With backing from JUI-led provincial governments, Pakistani madrassas, and the
clandestine support of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Taliban began to
reorganize.7
After stockpiling weapons, the Taliban launched their first guerilla attacks in the
winter of 2002-3. They targeted the southern provinces of Kandahar, Zabul and Helmand.
The Taliban also began targeting international aid workers and civilians. By autumn the
Taliban had established almost complete control over Zabul and Helmand provinces and
set up supply lines from Pakistan.77 All of this occurred while the United States and
coalition forces were busy hunting Osama Bin Laden and carrying out the invasion of
Iraq.
By 2005, Western perceptions that the Taliban had been defeated began to
change. Analysts such as Antonio Giustozzi focused their attention on the resurgence of
the Taliban and the quiet, ongoing guerilla war being waged in Afghanistan. With the
help of al-Qaeda, the Taliban dramatically improved their ambush tactics, their use of
improvised explosive devices (lEDs) and suicide bombers became a regular feature of
their arsenal.78 In 2006, the Taliban organized a broad offensive with the goal of recapturing Kandahar. Due to lack of troop presence in southern Afghanistan NATO forces
resorted to excessive use of airpower and "sweep and clear" tactics in order to root out
Taliban insurgents. These tactics antagonized local populations and turned them against
NATO forces.79 The Taliban's attack on Kandahar in 2006, which organized thousands of
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insurgents in battalion-sized units along with the logistical support of arms and
ammunition, was a turning point in the Western perception of the Taliban and Pakistan.80
It was now clear that the Taliban had not been "defeated," as previously thought, and that
the Taliban had established a base of organization and operation within Pakistan.
By 2007, The resurgent Taliban, or "neo-Taliban," established themselves as a
formidable insurgency. The neo-Taliban developed innovative strategies and tactics.
They even set up "sophisticated media outlets, which produced tens of thousands of
DVDs and inspirational tapes[.. .]The Taliban now used web sites, FM radio stations and
email, and their spokesmen gave interviews to journalists based in Pakistan."81 Constant
and effective harassment by Taliban insurgents resulted in a U.S. troop surge in 2009,
during which the Obama administration approved the deployment of 21,000 Marines to
southern Afghanistan. By the time of presidential elections that same year, the Taliban
controlled 164 out of 364 districts in Afghanistan.82 Voter "turnout was half that of the
first presidential election in 2004, when it was 73 percent. There were 400 Taliban
attacks on election day in which 26 people were killed and dozens more wounded - one
of the worst days of violence in the country's history."83 Although the UN and NATO
declared the elections a success, the successful attacks of the Taliban on election day
combined with dismal voter turnout and rampant voter fraud were all stark reminders that
the Taliban insurgency had developed into a serious problem.
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After almost a decade of military and political involvement in Afghanistan, the
United States and its NATO allies continue to struggle to eliminate the "neo-Taliban"
insurgency. Military and civilian researchers are still trying to define the variables which
allowed the neo-Taliban to develop into such an effective fighting and recruiting force in
the years following the Taliban's removal from power. With al-Qaeda's influence, the
"peasant" led Taliban of the 1990s evolved into a sophisticated insurgency group
"composed of hard-core jihadists who desire no compromise with the Americans or the
Kabul regime. Some, like Mullah Omar, are wedded to the al-Qaeda philosophy of global
jihad."84 Today the governments of Afghanistan and the United States are struggling to
adopt an effective strategy which can eliminate all aspects of the neo-Taliban movement
and restore stability to southern Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER II

THE ORIGINATION OF NEO-TALIBAN LITERATURE
The Taliban rose to prominence out of the tribal and ethnic conflict that was left
in the wake of Russia's withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989. Intellectual attention
to the Taliban began after they consolidated control of most of Afghanistan and
established a uniform government. Research such as Peter Marsden's "The Taliban: War
and Religion in Afghanistan" and Ahmed Rashid's "Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and
Fundamentalism in Central Asia" are two examples of analyses which thoroughly studied
the Taliban movement since its beginning in the mid nineties. These studies help form the
basis of our historical and anthropological understanding of the Taliban since the 1990's.
However, after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, a new body of research emerged
examining the Taliban's resurgence in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom. Since
the Afghan war, Taliban research includes counterinsurgency and insurgency theory,
nation-building studies, international relations, and most importantly an understanding of
who the Taliban really are and how they have evolved over the past decade.
The "Neo-Taliban" Afghan insurgency, first coined by The Economist magazine
in 200385, is relatively understudied when compared to the extensive body of literature
regarding the original Taliban who appeared out of the Afghan civil war years of 1989-
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1993.86 Research on the post 2001 "neo-Taliban" seeks to answer three fundamental
questions: who are the neo-Taliban; How have they organized a political and military
insurgency; and how have they successfully competed for the hearts and minds of Afghan
citizens? Scholars answer these questions in a number of different ways, each focusing on
different causal factors. Studies on the Taliban, neo-Taliban and the Afghan insurgency
can be separated into three major schools of thought based on distinct levels of analyses.
These categories are broadly defined as the system or international level of analysis,
including the regional level; the unit or state level of analysis; and the individual or substate level of analysis. The following section explores the recent literature on the Taliban
and Afghanistan according to a categorical approach based on levels of analysis. Finally,
the literature review concludes with the proposed application of a "synthetic" approach to
help better understand the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
Research of the Neo-Taliban and Afghanistan at the Individual Level of Analysis:
Explaining the success of the neo-Taliban at the individual level of analysis
provides an explanation of the complex ethnic, tribal, and religious makeup of
Afghanistan. Unlike the Taliban of the mid-nineties, the neo-Taliban are not a
"monolithic organization but one in which there are several interest groups."87 The
original Taliban were Pashtun dominated, however the neo-Taliban's identity is not based
on one ethnic group. Also, the Taliban of the nineties were motivated to fight because
they wanted to unite Afghanistan under their interpretation of sharia. The neo-Taliban are
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motivated by a myriad of reasons which cut across different religious, ideological, and
geographic spectrums.
While the majority of hard-core Taliban88 still identify Mullah Omar as their
leader, the critical reasons why many insurgents continue to support the Taliban has little
to do with Taliban leadership, ideology or ethnic/tribal motivations.89 The neo-Taliban
continue to refer to themselves as Taliban and have sought alliance and support with
hardcore Taliban because it elicits power, fear, and unity in many Afghans.90 Current
research stresses that we must continue to analyze the makeup of today's Taliban and
label them as neo-Taliban in order to reflect the complex and fractional nature of the
insurgency.91 Most importantly, as research on the Taliban and neo-Taliban continues,
scholars identify new motives for insurgents which further illustrates the complex and
constantly evolving nature of the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
Taliban and neo-Taliban insurgents fight for different reasons; however they have
a common enemy in the occupying Western forces and the perceived "puppet" Afghan
government. Traditional Taliban insurgents aim to overthrow the new Afghan
government in order to re-impose their radical interpretation of Sunni Islam.92 The
Taliban are joined by neo-Taliban insurgents who are motivated by enumerable reasons:
88
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to expand al-Qaeda's international terrorist network, hatred of occupying forces and local
government, need for income, safety, and fear. Due to the variety of motivational factors,
much confusion surrounds the identity of the opposition in Afghanistan. According to
Amin Tarzi, there is not much evidence of "an umbrella organization or a centralized
body directing activities, but instead several independent groups loosely linked by their
drive to oust the foreign forces in order to establish their own strongholds of power."
The heterogeneity of neo-Taliban insurgents at the individual level makes the
establishment of an accurate explanatory model almost impossible. Additionally, much of
the data collected regarding Taliban motivations is unreliable due to fears of Taliban
retaliation.94 Reliable data suggest that the vast majority of Afghans do not want the
Taliban to return to power and the insurgency does not include a huge amount of the
populace.95 The individual level of analysis provides the least amount of comprehensive
analysis to help explain the success of the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
The State Level of Analysis and the Afghan Insurgency:
Scholarship on the Afghan insurgency and the neo-Taliban focuses heavily on
variables at the state level of analysis. State-level analyses tend to address two major
categories when explaining the success of the neo-Taliban. First, scholars attribute much
of the neo-Taliban's success to mounting frustration and widespread corruption in Afghan
government institutions at national and local levels, and at the continuing lack of basic
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services.96 Second, scholars such as Antonio Giustozzi, Seth Jones, and Roland Paris
focus on analyzing counterinsurgency and insurgency strategy and policy. This approach
argues that the success of the neo-Taliban can be explained by analyzing the inadequacies
of NATO's various counterinsurgency strategies and the success of the neo-Taliban's
"hearts and minds" tactics.97 Both state-level approaches focus on the goals of specific
groups whose main objectives are to consolidate power within Afghanistan's borders,
thus largely removing them from the international arena.
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Approach:
An insurgency/counterinsurgency perspective on the Afghan insurgency helps
explain the success and the motivations of the neo-Taliban from a strategic perspective.
In his book "In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan," Seth Jones
analyzes the structure of counterinsurgency movements and what motivates insurgents to
fight. While Jones' research takes into account regional and international perspectives, his
analysis focuses on interpreting historical data and insurgency theory. Jones defines four
principal actors in insurgencies. First, the insurgents, those hoping to overthrow the
established national government or secede from it. In Afghanistan's case, insurgent
forces are comprised of the remnants of the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-iOS

Islami, al Qaida, and other foreign fighters.

The second set of actors in the Afghan

insurgency are the local government, which includes the government's security forces,
the army and the police, as well as key national and local political institutions.99 The third
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group consists of "external states and other non-state entities, which might support either
side. Outside actors can tip the balance of war in favor of either insurgents or the
government, but they can rarely win it for either side."100 Jones identifies the external
actors in Afghanistan as the United States, NATO forces, and the United Nations supporting the Afghan government - and the international jihadi network and some
individuals from neighboring states, such as Pakistan and Iran - supporting the
insurgency.
The last group of actors in an insurgency are the local population. Jones argues
that this group is the most important because "it is for their hearts and minds that the war
is being fought in the first place."101 Essentially it is the insurgent's job to propagate their
message and separate the population from the government and its external forces while at
the same time fighting and eluding the police and military. If insurgents manage to do
this, Jones argues, and if they are able to acquire the active or passive support of the
people, they are more likely to win the war.102 In the end, the successful exercise of
political power by the neo-Taliban depends on "the tacit or explicit agreement of the
population - or, at worst, on its submissiveness."103 Insurgencies are extremely complex
conflicts that depend on both material and ideological dominance in order for one side to
prevail.
The strategy of neo-Taliban insurgents is outlined by Paris as "a sophisticated
political-military strategy aimed at undermining confidence in the Karzai government
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through guerilla attacks on military and civilian targets, while at the same time offering
ordinary Afghans an alternative government in the form of religious justice."104 This
describes the neo-Taliban's strategy since reappearing in 2001, and they are very
successful in its execution. NATO counterinsurgency strategy, on the other hand, is not
so steadfast. Policy analysis by Giustozzi, Jones, and others reveals disagreement among
NATO allies regarding counterinsurgency strategy and describes the ad-hoc
implementation of multiple, sometimes conflicting counterinsurgency strategies by
uncoordinated NATO forces.105 Research on counterinsurgency strategy shows that
NATO is ineffective at eliminating the spread of the neo-Taliban through military means.
Governmental Approach:
Research at the state level also suggests that state governance has a large impact
on Afghan counterinsurgency strategy. Insurgencies are, to a large extent, a waiting
game.106 In order to win the game, you need effective governance that can combat the
encroachment of insurgency-administered justice. By 2006 the neo-Taliban established
such deep roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan that they believed they were strong enough
militarily and politically to outlast Western forces in the long run. According to Ahmed
Rashid,
As long as the Karzai government failed to govern effectively or provide services
and jobs to the people, as long as it allowed corruption and drug trafficking to
take place under its very nose, the Taliban were winning by default. The failure of
the government to provide quick and effective justice to the people only further
helped the Taliban cause.107
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Corruption in government has been a red flag for researchers and correlates well with the
continued spread of neo-Taliban influence.
Corruption and ineffectiveness in the Afghan government and the rise of neoTaliban popularity is usually explained in two ways by researchers. One approach
focuses on analyzing corruption within government institutions and the other approach
addresses the deficiencies of the institutions themselves. The first approach, supported by
Roland Paris, Seth Jones and Ahmed Rashid, argues that widespread corruption within
Karzai's government forced Afghan citizens to turn to insurgent-sponsored governmental
programs for basic needs.109 In 2007, Lieutenant General Eikenberry linked government
ineffectiveness and corruption with the success of neo-Taliban recruiting:
"The Long-term threat to campaign success, thought, is the potential irretrievable
loss of legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan. If the Afghan government is
unable to counter population frustration with the lack of progress in reform and
national development, the Afghan people may lose confidence in the nature of
their political system.' The result, he cautioned, would be a point 'at which the
Government of Afghanistan becomes irrelevant to its people, and the goal of
establishing a democratic, moderate, self-sustaining state could be lost
forever.'"110

Analyst Seth Jones describes corruption and incompetence as a "cancer" in the Afghan
government. Jones outlines three major categories of corruption specific to Afghanistan:
drug trafficking, bribery among senior officials, and pervasive extortion among Afghan
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police and judges.111 Jones' research also concludes that "Afghanistan's insurgency was
caused by a supply of disgruntled villagers unhappy with their government^..]The
existence of a weak and ineffectual government was a critical precondition to the rise of
violence in Afghanistan."112 The perceived failure and corruption of Afghanistan's
government is one of the most important variables explaining the neo-Taliban's
motivation to fight.
Research on the effects of corrupt and inadequate governance are supported by
studies from the United Nations, the European Union, the Afghan government, and the
U.S. government.113 Consensus among these studies finds that the appointment of
unprofessional, corrupt and ineffective government officials, especially at local levels,
reduced the trust and confidence of the Afghan people, making them easy prey for the
neo-Taliban's anti-government propaganda.

Jones points out that in 2006, the

interrogation of more than 100 neo-Taliban fighters by the U.S. military concluded: "the
critical reasons why [insurgent] fighters support the Taliban had little to do with religious
ideology. Rather, they had to do with bad government and economics. The government
could not protect them or deliver services, and they were often simply paid better by the
Taliban."115 Unlike the Afghan government, the Taliban rely on opium cultivation,
production, and trafficking for almost all of their funding needs.116 In 2008, the United
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Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released a survey which estimates that the
Taliban and other anti-government forces earned $250-470 million of income from
opium farming and trafficking.117
The second governance-based approach used to explain the accelerated rise of the
neo-Taliban focuses on the structure of the Afghan government and its implementation.
In "Defining Success in Afghanistan," Biddle et al argues that many of the failings of the
Afghan government are due to the administration's hastily organized, top-down
implementation of a Western-style democracy which is incompatible with the Afghan
state. Also popular among neo-Taliban literature is a critique of the failed implementation
of "Western," centralized democracy in Afghanistan. Jones argues that the top-down
approach to centralized government in Afghanistan only secured control of small, urban
areas and restricted the capabilities of the government to a select portion of the
population. He describes the style of centralized government in Afghanistan as the
country's "fatal flaw," concluding -- along with the majority of other researchers — that
for the Afghan government to outlast the neo-Taliban, they need to focus on "going
110
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Unfortunately, the policy proposals for going local and creating an Afghan

government with both local and national representation are equally as general and vague
as the calls for anti-corruption measures.
Rashid argues that the Afghan government will never be effective until NATO
and Afghan officials deal with poverty, economic malaise, education, and joblessness
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among the populations of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.119 Jones suggests the
establishment of well-coordinated tribal engagement strategy and other bottom-up
approaches.120 Biddle et al suggest a process of decentralization and "mixed sovereignty"
in order to accommodate the numerous political needs of Afghanistan's rural and tribal
populations.121 Tarzi proposes incorporating "moderate Taliban" into the political system,
eradicating criminal networks, and cutting off foreign lifelines to insurgents.122 The range
of opinions among neo-Taliban and Afghanistan scholars illustrates how difficult it is to
come to a consensus on how to solve the governance dilemma.
Insurgency strategy and institutional analysis at the state level help explain the
rise and success of the neo-Taliban and illustrates many of the specific problems within
the Afghan government and among the coalition allies meant to help defend and
reconstruct the Afghan state. However, this level of analysis has difficulty including the
Taliban in an international context, let alone a regional one. Additionally, the state level
of analysis runs the risk of over-simplifying the Afghan government and the neo-Taliban,
opting to describe each as a homogeneous group with established, agreed upon goals.
Afghanistan, Insurgency, and the Regional Level of Analysis:
Scholars such as Peter Marsden, Ahmed Rashid, Neamatollah Nojumi and
Nasreen Akhtar analyze the rise of the neo-Taliban and the Afghan insurgency from the
international and regional levels of analysis. These scholars focus heavily on the dynamic
histories and relationships between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States. In 2001,
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the task of rebuilding Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban was delegated among
various states and state-run international organizations. The United States, NATO, and a
larger international coalition has a United Nations mandate to reconstruct the Afghan
state.123 Researchers such as Ahmed Rashid and Nasreen Akhtar argue that the best way
to understand the rise of the neo-Taliban and the Afghan insurgency is to study the power
dynamics between the international actors involved in the reconstruction of
Afghanistan.124 Most important among these actors are those with the most at stake in
Afghanistan politically and economically — the United States and Pakistan.
Regional analysis by scholars suggests that the successful resurgence of the neoTaliban in 2001, along with the successful rise of the Taliban in 1996, can be traced back
to the influence of one state actor, Pakistan.125 During the Taliban's rise, Pakistan's
government and military equipped, trained, financed, and guided the Taliban struggle in
order to advance its own interests.126 Those interests, according to Akhtar, were defined
broadly as the support of the Taliban movement in order to checkmate its regional rivals
and keep itself in a position of greater influence than others in the region, specifically
India.127 According to Rashid, one of the foremost scholars on relations between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the seven tribal areas in northern Pakistan known as the
Federal Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) served as the initial staging grounds of
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the Taliban resurgence.128 Using historical analysis, scholars such as Akhtar, Rashid, and
Marsden argue that support for the Taliban during the 1990's cemented ethnic, religious,
and political ties which would allow the defeated Taliban leadership of 2001 a place of
refuge and a geographical headquarters from which stage a resurgence within
199

Afghanistan.
Finding a way to close the porous borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan is a
pivotal objective in the fight against the neo-Taliban in Afghanistan.130 The international
school of thought also helps explain why the neo-Taliban were able to take refuge in
Pakistan, and why Pakistan continues to be a base of operation for the neo-Taliban
insurgency in Afghanistan today. Akhtar and Nojumi argue that the Pakistani
government's support for the Taliban over the years made it the sole international
stakeholder concerned with the Taliban's success or failure. Thus Pakistani officials
largely turned a blind eye to the arrival of Taliban fighters within the FATA.131
Continued indifference by Pakistani officials towards Taliban refugees and documented
refusal of officials to apprehend or report Taliban personnel living in Pakistan has further
shaped relations and discourses between Pakistan, the United States, and Afghanistan
1 ^9

regarding the conflict.

Rashid concludes that "the lack of trust between the Pakistani

military and the US government helped fuel the revival of the Taliban movement."133
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The strength of the regional perspective's explanation of the neo-Taliban's rise is
the fact that it contextualizes the Afghan insurgency within a regional power dynamic.
The research of scholars like Rashid and Akhtar brings attention to the volatile
international environment in which Afghanistan is being reconstructed. Researchers
remind us that successful state-building efforts in Afghanistan are contingent, in part, on
the "positive involvement of all state actors that have the capacity to influence its internal
politics and security[...]At the moment, Afghanistan's neighbor Pakistan is playing a
crucial role with American forces and NATO. Pakistan is fighting a war against terrorism
on behalf of the U.S. administration."134 However, the international perspective can
overlook specific actors at the state and individual levels which better explain why neoTaliban militants fight, who they are, and who should be developing an effective strategy
to combat them.
Concluding Thoughts On the State of Neo-Taliban Literature:
The literature reviewed helps identify the different actors that make up the neoTaliban and their motivations for opposing the Afghan government and NATO forces.
Each level of analysis provides important information regarding the conflict in
Afghanistan. The regional, state, and individual perspectives of Afghanistan and the neoTaliban show that the neo-Taliban insurgency is not occurring in a historical or political
vacuum. Every actor involved in the conflict, whether they are part of the Taliban, the
Afghan government, or NATO are operating within an international environment. The
major weakness of the international explanatory model is the absence of a theoretical
application which helps structure the dynamics of the conflict according to international
1
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relations norms. In order to better understand the neo-Taliban in an international context,
this analysis proposes a unique theoretical approach which combines elements of the state
and sub-state dynamics of the neo-Taliban in a way which does not ignore the structure
of the international environment in which the neo-Taliban exist.
Accurately explaining the neo-Taliban, Afghan insurgency requires combining
variables at the individual, state, regional, and international levels of analysis. It is
necessary to consolidate these variables into one theoretical framework in order to gain a
better understanding of the structural dynamics and discourses which shape this conflict.
In an effort to enhance the field of neo-Taliban literature, this analysis will apply
Cornelia Beyer's "Synthetic Approach," — which she uses to explain international
terrorism in the Middle East — to the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Applying
Beyer's synthetic approach to the neo-Taliban and Afghanistan will illustrate the complex
relationships between state and non-state actors currently involved in Afghanistan, their
power dynamics, and the ideological discourses which structure their relationships.
Beyer's article, Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counterpower: A Synthetic
Approach uses international terrorism as an illustration to examine the effects of U.S.
hegemony in "mind and matter" on the Middle East.135 Beyer believes that in order for
International Relations to progress, key tenets of structural realism and constructivism
must be combined to form a synthetic theoretical approach. Beyer's framework rests on
several key principles. First, in accordance with influential realist theoretician Kenneth
Waltz, that the international system is configured according to material polarity. Material
polarity refers to the idea that a state's domination is based on material factors such as
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gross domestic product, military power, natural resources, arms, and population.136
Beyer's synthetic approach to explaining international terrorism is first contingent on the
idea that the world is unipolar, with the United States able to exert the most political,
economic and military power throughout the world.137 Beyer believes that it is the United
States' powerful "material factors," that allow it to dominate internationally.
However, Beyer adds that "it is not only material factors that can explain US
dominance in international affairs, ideational factors also have to be considered, as a tool
and resource of power."138 The United States has the most material power according to
realists, but it also has the most ideational power in some regions of the world,
constructivists would argue, making it a regional hegemon.
Hegemony implies more than just having preponderant material capabilities at
one's disposal; additional factors also play a role, such as the capacity to exercise
power based on material capabilities, and 'soft power' or ideological power,
meaning the capability to change others' behavior by influencing their belief
system, their way of thinking, and even their rationality.139

In order to "understand the multidimensional reality of US predominance," Beyer
argues we must reconcile realist and constructivist approaches into one, synthetic
theoretical framework. This is possible, Beyer posits, because the ideational and the
material are intrinsically linked and partly interdependent.140 Beyer's proof lies in the
belief that human affairs are structured by both material and ideational factors.
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For material change to occur, ideas have to be expressed in creative or destructive
action. Humans therefore act as the creators of ideas and as the mediators between
ideas and the material. Regarded by realists as material facts (population) and in
constructivism as bearers of ideas (agents), humans operate in both dimensions,
able to transform the ideational into the material, and vice versa.141
According to this view, ideas are needed for creating and changing material facts, which
are represented in matter (infrastructure, government buildings, the police, the media,
etc).142 Essentially, nothing—except the original conditions of nature which existed before
human life—can exist without preceding ideas, which are the catalysts for altering
material in a creative or destructive manner. The United States, Beyer concludes is the
most dominant state in both the ideational (its discourse and ideology) and material (its
economy, armaments) dimensions. US hegemony, therefore, rests on material
foundations but was created and is maintained via the promotion of ideas.143
Beyer goes on to apply the logic of her synthetic approach to help explain
international terrorism in the Middle East. According to Waltz, unipolarity in the
international system naturally leads to counter-balancing in an attempt to return the
"balance of power" in relations between nations.

In the Middle East, especially in a

country such as Afghanistan with few natural resources and a government of elites
approved by the United States, there are no counter-balancing forces present to resist the
hegemonic imposition of US material and ideational dominance. Terrorism, therefore, is
a result of the absence of a tendency towards equilibrium at the state level.145 Logically,
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if insufficient balancing occurs at the state level, actors at the sub-state level compensate
by using terrorism or insurgency to balance foreign intervention and the spread of
ideological or cultural influence that not all Middle Eastern populations approve of.146
Conceptualizing, Defining, and Measuring the "Synthetic Approach":
Cornelia Beyer's synthetic approach to explaining the rise of international
terrorism in Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counterpower utilizes a combination of several
key components of international relations theory. This analysis will use Beyer's
theoretical foundation in order to gain a better understand of the neo-Taliban's complex
makeup and the Afghan insurgency in an international context. Beyer's synthetic
approach combines key elements of realism and constructivism into two major pillars of
thought. Within the first pillar, Beyer merges the realist interpretations of unipolarity in
the international system with the constructivist idea of hegemony. The combination of
these two frameworks creates what Beyer describes as hegemony in mind and matter or
"thick hegemony."147 Thick hegemony helps explain how power is distributed
throughout the international system according to both material (realism) and ideational
(constructivism) considerations. Within the second pillar, Beyer uses realism's balanceof-power model and a constructivist interpretation of "tendency towards equilibrium" to
explain the shifting power constellations among states both regionally and
internationally.
Understanding and accurately measuring the power of state and sub-state actors
according to their capabilities requires the consideration of both material factors
(population, territory, resource endowment, economic capability) and nonmaterial factors
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(political stability and competence).148 Beyer's synthetic approach encourages measuring
material and non-material considerations in conjunction with one another when trying to
determine the power and influence of state and non-state actors. In the context of the
Afghan war and Taliban insurgency, a synthetic approach enhances our understanding of
the complex distribution of power among major state and sub-state actors and offers
comprehensive explanations to questions regarding the ongoing military insurgency in
Afghanistan and the country's uncertain future. In order to apply these frameworks to the
neo-Taliban and Afghanistan, several additional terms must be defined and measured.
Polarity and Hegemony:
Beyer's analysis rests on the idea that the United States is arguably the sole
superpower in a unipolar system. Many realist scholars, most notably Kenneth Waltz,
believe that the structure of the international system is best defined in terms of
distribution of power.149 A state's "power" is traditionally determined through the
measurement of its resources and capabilities. The resources and capabilities of a state
are factors such as the measure of its population, technological capabilities, territory,
resource endowment, economic capability, and military might.150 These strictly material
factors are then measured relationally among important international actors in order to
determine "poles of power."151 Essentially, this process establishes a formula to measure
the international system's configuration in order to determine the center(s) of domination
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and the number of dominating states.152 Using this formula, Waltz -with the support of
additional scholarship153 — argues that unipolarity is a global reality.154
In order to adapt Beyer's analysis to Afghanistan, this study will forego Beyer's
dependence on a unipolar interpretation and instead apply the logic of Samuel
Huntington's uni-multipolar system. Opposed to a unipolar system, where one
superpower could effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no
combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so;
Huntington's uni-multipolar system argues that solving key international issues in today's
world requires the leadership of a superpower (the United States) but always with some
combination of other major states.155 Huntington argues that the United States is at the
apex of the uni-multipolar system and has the power to promote its interests in "virtually
every part of the world."156 On the second tier of the uni-multipolar echelon are major
regional powers that are preeminent in certain areas of the world but are unable to extend
their interests and capabilities as globally as the United States. One example of a regional
power is Pakistan in Southern Asia.157 Finally, at the third level are secondary regional
powers whose interests often conflict with the more powerful regional states.158 In
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Afghanistan, these third-level actors can be separated into two major groups. The first
group is made up of the Afghan national government and any pro-government Afghan
forces. The second group includes any anti-Government or anti-NATO forces, including
the Taliban, neo-Taliban insurgents, and al-Qaeda. This analysis will apply Huntington's
uni-multipolar approach to polarity in Afghanistan because it takes into consideration
each actor's role in the conflict while still remaining within the theoretical confines of
polarity, realism, and constructivism.
In order to better understand how the United States' position as the only regional
(and to some extent global) superpower affects its ability to achieve its goals in
Afghanistan requires more than just an understanding of material factors. A
comprehensive understanding of U.S. capabilities in Afghanistan and Southern Asia must
also combine the "ideational" or ideological factors that the United States uses as tools of
power in the Middle East. Research supporting U.S. hegemony is extensive and well
established.159 Combining the idea of hegemony with polarity adds a dimension of
understanding that goes beyond just material considerations.
Hegemony implies more than just having preponderant material capabilities at
one's disposal; additional factors also play a role, such as the capacity to exercise
power based on material capabilities, and 'soft power' or ideological power,
meaning the capability to change others' behavior by influencing their belief
system, their way of thinking, and even their rationality.160
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Antonio Gramsci, a social scientist who pioneered the concept of hegemony,
described it as "the additional power, beyond domination, that accrues to a dominant
group by it convincing subordinate groups that its rule serves not only its own interests
but also those of the sub-ordinate groups."161 Hegemony is measured through the
domination of a state's discourse and ideology. The ideational hegemony of the United
States includes the promulgation of ideology such as free market economy, capitalism,
consumerism, democracy, and freedom. The power and prominence of these ideas in
domestic and international politics combined with the dominant material power of the
United States form what Beyer calls "thick hegemony." "US hegemony, then, rests on
material foundations, but was created and is maintained via the promotion of ideas."162
The analytical framework of this research seeks to determine levels of hegemony in
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia through a synthesis of material and ideational power.
Understanding who the most powerful actors are in Afghanistan and what their interests
are is essential for answering the main question of this research: why does the Taliban
insurgency still exist after 10 years of occupation and nation-building?
Balance of Power and Equilibrium:
A synthetic analysis of the impact of hegemony in mind and matter on the Afghan
insurgency and the Taliban requires the explanation of several more theoretical concepts.
Balance of power and equilibrium are two powerful ideas in international relations which
explain how and why states compete and cooperate with one another for international
power. Waltz argues that unipolarity leads to counter-balancing by groups of weaker
161
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states in order to restore the international "balance of power, which is most stable in a
bipolar constellation.163 According to Waltz, "In an asymmetric constellation, the weaker
power will balance against the stronger one; and symmetric powers will also balance
against each other, but not if they can coalesce - align with each other, or bandwagon with a stronger one, against a dominating power."164 Tendency towards equilibrium,
described by balance of power politics, is assumed to be a rational outcome based on the
competitive nature of states and the state of anarchy which international relations
exists.165
Constructivism, on the other hand, would attribute transformations among state
relations to changes in the "underlying logic of interaction into a social, other-regarding
one."166 Alexander Wendt argues that our understanding of the international system
should include an appreciation of how the mechanics of "dyadic, triadic, and n-actor
interaction shape and are in turn shaped by 'stocks of knowledge' that collectively
constitute identities and interests and, more broadly, constitute the structures of
international life."

The constructivist perspective explains changes in international

balance of power by focusing on the reasons why states accept or oppose asymmetric and
symmetric conditions and why they abstain or initiate balancing procedures according to
changes in internal ideas and norms.

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 2002), 123.
164

Beyer, "Synthetic Approach," 416.

165

Ibid.

166

Ibid., 417.

167

Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,"
International Organization 46:2 (Spring 1992): 424.

46
Combining constructivist and realist perceptions of balance of power and
equilibrium allows consideration of both state and sub-state level variables more
coherently. Wendt, Beyer and other analysts advocate the need for a synthetic use of
international relations theory in order for the field to progress as a whole. According to
Wendt:
Statism need not be bound by realist ideas about what 'state' must mean. State
identities and interests can be collectively transformed within an anarchic context
by many factors—individual, domestic, systemic, or transnational—and as such
are an important dependent variable. Such a reconstruction of state-centric
international theory is necessary if we are to theorize adequately about the
emerging forms of transnational political identity that sovereign states will help
bring into being. To the extent, I hope that statism, like the state, can be
historically progressive.
Following in Wendt and Beyer's theoretical footsteps, this analysis builds on the concept
of a "synthetic" approach to international relations theory by applying realist and
constructivist frameworks to analyze the Taliban and the Afghan insurgency. The
relevant concepts for realist and constructivist thought, as they apply to this analysis,
have been categorized and defined in this section and will be utilized throughout the
subsequent analysis to contribute to the growing field of research which strives to better
understand the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER III
APPLYING THE SYNTHETIC APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN AND THE NEOTALIBAN
The Taliban regime in Afghanistan officially came to an end in early December,
2001. By mid-2006, the Taliban's surviving leadership, along with neo-Taliban recruits
had established areas of control in the Southern and Eastern provinces of Afghanistan,
from which they launched significant attacks. In December 2009, President Obama
announced a "surge" of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan to stabilize the countryside. Since
then, U.S. and U.K. publicly announced a tentative withdrawal from Afghanistan by
2015. On June 22nd, President Obama announced his plan to withdraw all 33,000
members of the "surge" by 2012.169 The war in Afghanistan has been going on longer
than World War Two and Vietnam. As of June 7th, 2010 the Afghan War is the longest
war in US history.170 According to many analysts, securing Afghanistan is no longer
about removing the Taliban from power or defeating al-Qaeda through military means;
the future of a stable, democratic Afghanistan and a successful NATO withdrawal are
now political problems.171 Extending the ideas of power, polarity, equilibrium, thick
hegemony, and the mutuality of both ideas and material facts to the Taliban and the
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Afghan insurgency helps explain the complex dynamics underlying the ongoing conflict
and why NATO forces have not been able to remove the Taliban.
The Afghan Insurgency and the Uni-Multipolar System:
Interpreting the Afghan war according to Huntington's uni-multipolar system
creates a unique way to look at the ongoing Taliban insurgency. As previously
mentioned, the major actors involved in the Afghan war include global, regional, and
local "poles" of power. These actors span across three levels. At the first level is the
United States, a major superpower and a state actor which wishes to have the most
influence in Afghanistan both materially and ideologically. At the second level is
Pakistan, the only major regional power that is heavily invested in the future of
Afghanistan. At the third level are secondary powers which either support the Afghan
national government and the United States or align themselves with Taliban and neoTaliban insurgents in order to resist US-led domination in the region. Examining how
these actors interact and interpret their roles in Afghanistan and the wider region helps us
understand the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan in terms of power, hegemony, and
equilibrium.
Huntington argues that in a uni-multipolar system, the residing superpower would
prefer the emergence of a unipolar system in which it is the sole hegemon and often acts
as if such a system exists.17 The other powers, however, "would prefer a multi-polar
system in which they could pursue their interests, unilaterally and collectively, without
being subject to constraints, coercion, and pressure by the stronger superpower."173 In

Huntington, "Lonely Superpower," 37.

Afghanistan, relations between the United States, the Afghan government, Pakistan, and
sub-state actors follows this exact trajectory. As one of the world's few superpowers, the
United States often acts unilaterally to achieve its goals. America's unilateral tendencies
are constantly illustrated by cross border drone strikes in Pakistan and most recently with
the killing of Osama bin-Laden inside Pakistan without the Pakistani government's
cooperation, consent, or knowledge.174 Unilateral actions by the United States in
Afghanistan and the region intimidate and anger Pakistan, the Afghan government, and
sometimes even NATO allies.175
The current uni-multipolar system in Afghanistan and Pakistan is devolving into a
situation where second and third level actors such as Pakistan and the Afghan
government feel threatened by what they see as the American pursuit of regional
hegemony through unilateral means.

For every multilateral success involving the

cooperation of Afghan, NATO, and Pakistani forces, there is an opposite, unilateral
action that not all sides agree is in their best interest. None of the principal powerwielders in Afghanistan are happy with the current status quo, and as long as the United
States acts as if it were a unipolar hegemon in Afghanistan, without the consent or
collaboration of the Afghan or Pakistani governments, cooperation and support will erode
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as regional, state, and sub-state actors increasingly assert themselves to promote their
177

own interests.
The next sections of this analysis employ some of the main concepts of
Huntington's view of polarity and Beyer's synthetic approach in order to further
understand the uni-multipolar power constellations within Afghanistan and the region and
how these power relationships affect the neo-Taliban insurgency. Ultimately, the goal of
adapting the synthetic approach and the idea of polarity to Afghanistan is to provide
alternative explanations for the continued rise of the Taliban and neo-Taliban and the
reasons for their resilience and determination.
Power Equilibrium, the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan:
According to Waltz's interpretation of polarity, balancing between states takes
place in unequal relationships of power.

The power relationship between the states of

the Southeast Asia — especially Afghanistan — and the United States is highly unequal, so
balancing is expected. Comparing material indicators shows that Afghanistan and
surrounding countries, such as Pakistan, are significantly weaker than the United States
and its Western allies in military, economic, and technologic terms, with declining
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Table 2180
Realism's indicators of "material" power.
United States

Pakistan

Afghanistan

14,119

162

14

45,989

955

486

697.105,000,000

5,160,000,000

250,000,000

Population

307,007,000

169,708,303

29,802,724

Mortality Rate

8.38

6.92

17.39

GDP (USD
Billions)
GDP per capita
(USD)
Military Spending
(USD)

(Deaths/1,000
population)
These values would lead us to believe that the states of the Middle East and Southeast
Asia, especially Afghanistan and Pakistan, would both oppose and try to balance the
United States in order to assert their power and achieve their own interests.181 "Attempts
to balance US power in the region "should take the form of regional integration in the
Middle East, while seeking alignment specifically with China, and also with Russia."
However, as Beyer points out, with the exceptions of Iran and Syria, there is little sign of
such balancing among Middle Eastern and South Asian states.
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Data Sources: World Bank Development indicators and the CIA World Factbook. All figures recorded
for year 2009.
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The explanations as to why power balancing at the state level is largely absent in
Afghanistan can be grouped into two major categories. The first and most evident
explanations relate to the US removal of Afghanistan's state apparatus — the Taliban —
and facilitation of the creation of a centralized democracy through the Bonn Agreement.
The second group of explanations deals directly with Pakistan and helps explain the
dynamic political relations between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan
and the ISI invested significant amounts of money and training in Afghan development
and Afghan militant movements since the mujahedeen began fighting the Soviet Union in
1979.183 Pakistan's cooperation with the United States at the beginning of Operation
Enduring Freedom marked a turning point in their relationship with Afghanistan and the
Taliban. Afghanistan's only regional ally fell in step with the United States at the
beginning of the war, widening a power void which would eventually be filled by
elements of the Taliban insurgency.
Pakistan's role and allegiances within the uni-multipolar world of Southeast Asia
have changed over time depending on fluid, sometimes conflicting interests. Before
September 11th, Pakistan overtly supported the Taliban through the nation's spy agency,
the Interservices Intelligence Agency (ISI). Economic and military support between
Afghan militants and the ISI dates back to the Soviet-Afghan war, when the ISI trained
and outfitted many mujahedeen fighters within Pakistan and sent them across the border
to combat Soviet forces with new tactics and weaponry.184 When the Taliban came to
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power in the late 1990s, the ISI targeted them for support because they were the only
group strong enough to fight against the warlords of the Northern Alliance, who
controlled Northern Afghanistan and received financial and military support from
Pakistan's regional rival, India.185 The regional power struggle between India and
Pakistan played a large part in the alliance of the ISI and the Taliban, and it would be
regional power shifts which would break them apart in 2001.
Days after September 11th, 2001 President Bush announced that America was at
war with international terrorists and declared a state of emergency.186 On September 15th
Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf was "given an ultimatum by President Bush ('you
are either with us or against us'), and the military regime immediately decided to switch
sides, from helping the Taliban to supporting the US invasion of Afghanistan that would
destroy it."187 Once again, Pakistan's decision was guided by regional power dynamics.
The major reason for acquiescing to the United States' demands, Musharraf stated, was
that any other response could have led to "the bombing of Pakistan, threats to its nuclear
facilities, and the creation of US military bases in neighboring India, Pakistan's longstanding enemy."188 Since 2001, different actors among the military, the government, and
the ISI appeared to pursue a dual track of condemning and hunting the Taliban on one
1 RQ
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This sparked extensive debate in

Western and domestic media about whether Pakistan's President Perves Musharraf was
committed to defeating the Taliban insurgency.190
The debate has two major standpoints, some claiming that Musharraf was not in
control or aware of ISI support for the Taliban and others arguing that Musharraf was no
longer interested in the stability of the Karzai regime, thus allowing and maybe even
supporting Taliban elements within Pakistan.191 Today Pakistan faces a new barrage of
questions and doubts from Western sources after the location and killing of Osama binLaden within their borders and Pakistan's subsequent denial of any knowledge of bin1 99

Laden's whereabouts previous to the American raid.

Bin Laden's ability to hide in

Pakistan is a perfect illustration of the inability of Pakistani officials to control unwanted
elements within their own state borders. For many reasons, Pakistan and Afghanistan do
not function like traditional states. The perception that Pakistan has control of its own
1 Q^

territory and can find and eliminate Taliban elements within its own country are false.
The Taliban's ability to transcend Pakistani borders is based on a long history of support
from Pakistani leaders. When the Taliban were picked as Pakistan's favorites to control
Afghanistan, "Pakistan's military and civilian leaders insisted that the Taliban's success
was Pakistan's success and that its policy was correct and unchangeable."194 Pakistani
officials believed that by supporting the Taliban they would eliminate Iranian, Russian,
Indian and Christian influences in their region, and by spreading the message of the
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Afghan Mujaheddin they would "revive Islam and create a new Pakistan-led Islamic
block of nations."195 This perception lives on, to some extent, today and has proved to be
a constant source of doubt and indignation for Pakistan in the Afghan War and Taliban
insurgency.
Whether or not the allegations against Pakistan are true doesn't matter, the
damage is done. The Afghan War took a seemingly insurmountable toll on Pakistan
economically and politically.196 Pakistan sacrificed hundreds of soldiers' lives, millions of
dollars, and suffered thousands of terrorist attacks during the war.197 However, in a unimultipolar world which depends on the alliance and cooperation of lesser powers in order
to balance the power of a hegemon, Pakistan has no one to turn to and is thus stuck
tolerating the status-quo. Pakistan cannot forsake its allegiance to America's war on terror
because it risks losing power in the region to India. However, an ailing economy and
constant battles among Pakistani and American military forces and neo-Taliban in the
border regions of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) turned public
opinion in Pakistan against the war and is helping fuel anti-American sentiment
throughout the country.198 Pakistani policymakers are rethinking their long-term interests
in Afghanistan and are beginning to speak out against perceptions of American
hegemony in the region. In fact, they are boldly declaring that the US lacks understanding
of the situation in Pakistan; that the US is taking its Pakistani alliance for granted; and
195
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that Pakistan's support for the US war in Afghanistan is ultimately destabilizing its own
country.199 Thus the power constellation containing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the
United States in Southeast Asia is shifting. As more and more Pakistani officials in the
government and military see the United States as a threat, Pakistan seeks to balance
America's growing power with Chinese allies.
Pakistan is desperately appealing to China. Much has been made of a trip there
from which the prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, has just returned. The
government appears to see China as some kind of replacement for the Americans
in Pakistan, and perhaps in Afghanistan too. Much is fantasy. Even the Chinese
privately urge Pakistan to put down the extremists, repair relations with America
and get its economy moving.200

Since the beginning of the Afghan War, the United States has been trying to
establish material and ideational hegemony in Afghanistan, or what Beyer would call
"thick" hegemony. By sponsoring the state building process in Afghanistan, the United
States helped create a government of client-elites who found it in their best interest to
align themselves with their Western sponsor and cooperate under an asymmetrical power
arrangement within a very small geographic area.201 However, US "thick" hegemony in
Afghanistan has failed to materialize over the years. The United States used its material
dominance in the region to appear a powerful hegemon, however it never gained the
legitimacy needed to establish soft power and ideational hegemony among Afghan
citizens, and Pakistani allies. Hegemonic stability theory explains the relationship that
developed in Afghanistan among the United States, the newly formed Afghan
government, and regional influence from the Pakistani government.
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Hegemonic stability theory argues that the role of the hegemon can be a
collectively beneficial one in ensuring order via the promotion of political institutions,
the implementation of norms and the facilitation of cooperation.202 Through multilateral,
non-selfish behavior, the hegemon's material dominance "is accepted by other states as
more profitable than threatening. The hegemon thus acquires ideational power: namely
soft power and legitimacy."203 Cooperation under asymmetry between the United States
and the newly established Afghan government was not the result of well established
diplomatic ties between Bush and Karzai or the collective will of Afghans to see
democracy and freedom transform their nation. Karzai and other Afghan government
officials cooperated with the United States because the multilateral, constructive efforts
of coalition forces transformed the logic of interaction in the direction of cooperation.204
The tendency towards equilibrium through alternate means of power balancing (such as
violent, competitive relations) is absent as the cooperation of unequal partners is
interpreted as achieving both party's needs at the state level.
While the relationship between the United States and the Afghan government at
the state level favors cooperation, this sentiment is not echoed at the sub-state level.
Popular opinion of the United States as a benign hegemon does not exist in Afghanistan.
According to international polling in 2009, only 47% of Afghans view the United States
"favorably" and just 37% of Afghans say they support NATO/IS AF forces in their
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area.205 Turmoil and resentment is growing at the sub-state level among Afghan citizens
and tribes. As the scholarship regarding corruption in the Afghan government shows,
there is a serious lack of trust and legitimacy between citizens and government in
Afghanistan. This is particularly prevalent in rural areas where the neo-Taliban vie for
power by providing traditional state services where the Afghan government or coalition
forces are absent.206 Thus the Taliban continue to represent an "antihegemonic coalition,"
developed at sub-state levels of the multipolar system within Afghanistan in order to
907

counter American superpowerdom and American attempts at hegemony in the region.
Huntington points out that actors respond in various ways to American hegemony
throughout the world, "At a relatively low level are widespread feelings of fear,
resentment, and envy[...]At a somewhat higher level, resentment may turn to dissent, with
other countries, including allies, refusing to cooperate[...]In a few cases, dissent has
turned to outright opposition as countries attempt to defeat U.S. policy. The highest level
of response would be the formation of an antihegemonic coalition involving several
major powers."208 Huntington argues that in a uni-multipolar system, such a grouping of
actors in opposition to one superpower would be a natural phenomenon. Thus we begin
to see how the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan can be interpreted as an
"antihegemonic coalition" of actors, driven by a logical desire to balance against the
hegemonic tendencies of an overbearing actor within their system. According to this
205
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perspective and building on Beyer's finding in her analysis on Terrorism in the Middle
East, the Taliban and neo-Taliban insurgency are symptoms of natural balancing
tendencies within the uni-multipolar system.209
Intervention and Insurgency Strategy and the Logic of "tit-for-tat" Reciprocity:
Antonio Giustozzi succinctly describes the opposing strategies of neo-Taliban
insurgents and NATO forces in his research. The conflict, he observes:
Pitts Taliban strength (abundance of committed, ideologically indoctrinated
young fighters, able to achieve basic tasks even without supervision by field
commanders) against government/coalition weaknesses (shortage of manpower,
little presence in the villages, inability to patrol extensively away from the main
roads, lack of effective intelligence network).210
Analysts agree that counterinsurgency operations are largely ineffective and
undermanned in rural parts of Afghanistan.211 Due to lack of financial support and troop
presence, U.S. counterinsurgency efforts beginning in 2002 were conducted using "sweep
and clear" tactics. Giustozzi defines three main reasons why sweep and clear tactics
failed to eradicate the neo-Taliban insurgency. First, US heavy-handed, intrusive tactics
invaded Afghan's privacy and broke Afghan tribal and ethical codes of behavior. Second,
formation and reliance on local anti-Taliban strongmen and militias in counterinsurgency
efforts led to more abuse of rural populations. Third, heavy reliance on airstrikes led to
increased collateral damage, distrust, and fear among Afghan civilians. In 2010 the
United Nations Assistant Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded 171 civilian deaths
due to air strike and close air support, and 102 civilian deaths due to search and seizure or
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"raid" operations.212 Overall, sweep and clear tactics undermined US credibility and led
local populations to fear and despise the forceful imposition of US material and
ideational power.
In 2005 the U.S. military changed its counterinsurgency tactics. Realizing the
ineffectiveness of sweep and clear operations, they initiated a "village-focused"
counterinsurgency approach.213 With increased funds devoted to counterinsurgency
efforts, the military introduced a series of "development" projects which sought to
combat the insurgency by providing services and jobs to local Afghans based on a
"benefits-for-information" approach. The logic behind this new approach was based on
the belief that distributing aid and providing jobs would win local support and also create
pro-government informers.214 The benefits-for-information approach essentially
established a system of patronage between the U.S. military and Afghan civilians based
on the provision of information about insurgent activities.215 From an equilibrium
standpoint, the United States was trying to use its power to promote both material and
ideational incentives for sub-state cooperation.
By 2006, the Taliban had amassed so many combatants that the safety and
viability of small reconstruction teams dispersed throughout villages and towns were
compromised. District garrisons of British and US troops were besieged by Taliban
forces concentrated in the hundreds and sometimes thousands throughout Helmand and
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other parts of Southern Afghanistan.

NATOs counterinsurgency strategy was forced to

shift back towards a "sweep and clear" approach and large-scale military operations were
re-implemented in order to push the Taliban back. By 2007, US government officials
917

acknowledged the growing insurgency in Afghanistan.

However, as Giustozzi and

Jones point out in their research, the continuous alterations in military strategy adopted to
deal with the insurgency led to confusion both logistically and financially within NATO,
ultimately impeding their ability develop an effective way to combat the Taliban
throughout Afghanistan.
US, Canadian, and British forces now employ a wide variety of
counterinsurgency tactics, ranging from sweep and clear operations to small scale
development operations. Dutch, German, and Australian troops, critical of America's
heavy reliance on airpower and overwhelming force, distance themselves from American
counterinsurgency strategy.218 Crews and Sarwari write that "German troops admit that
they avoided mixing with Americans out of fear that Afghans will fail to distinguish
between them or that they will lose their 'good reputation' among Afghans."219 Dutch
and Australian forces adopted the "Dutch approach" to counterinsurgency, which focuses
on supporting local government and establishing contact with the population instead of
finding and eliminating insurgents.220 Dutch forces argue that Americans "were very
arrogant and focused on destroying the 'Taliban' without even knowing exactly who
216
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[they] were."

The ad-hoc implementation of multiple, conflicting counterinsurgency

strategies by often-times uncoordinated NATO forces is ineffective at eliminating the
neo-Taliban insurgency. Additionally, it demonstrates a lack efficient use of material
dominance among coalition forces at all levels.
Use of excessive force and airpower during counterinsurgency operations was a
constant thorn in NATO's side since the beginning of the war when the tactic was used
effectively to uproot and kill al-Qaeda forces still hiding in Afghanistan. Applying
Beyer's use of tit-for-tat reciprocity within the synthetic framework adds additional
insight into why material and psychological harm among the population can be so
detrimental for the superpower's ability to maintain its power and establish hegemony.
Tit-for-tat, according to Robert Axelrod, describes a strategy of interaction between
actors which proclaims a strict reciprocity: "cooperation answered with cooperation,
defection with defection."222 Tit-for-tat is a balancing strategy in which actors expect the
actions of others to be reciprocal behavior which recreates or maintains equilibrium. This
reciprocity, argues Beyer, can take the form of either positive or negative action towards
the other actor.
Therefore, the "enactment of power in an oppositional (offensive or violent) way
leads to more violence (and hence to counter-violence) rather than submission,
particularly in the absence of soft power."223 Using the logic of tit-for-tat and equilibrium,
we find that violence (mistaken or intended) in the form of counterinsurgency operations
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is a reason for insurgents to engage in counter-violence in a reciprocal fashion in order to
restore what they interpret as the equilibrium of power at the sub-state level. In
Afghanistan, the reciprocal nature of violence has both an ideational and material
component. Ideologically, collateral damage and the loss of civilian life can be used by
the Taliban to "validate their narratives that the conflict in Afghanistan is 'a cosmic
994

conflict between the righteous' and the infidel who want to kill innocent Muslims.'"
Additionally, cultural dynamics influence violence in Afghanistan. Afghans, especially
Pashtuns are historically independent and highly xenophobic.225 Local tribal codes of
behavior and honor advocate revenge in the form of reciprocal acts of violence, thus
promoting tit-for-tat behavior for acts of violence committed by NATO forces
accidentally.22
Materially, reciprocal attacks by insurgents can be measured in a number of ways.
Because defeating the Afghan insurgency is now a battle for the "hearts and minds" of the
people, measuring civilian casualties provides insight into escalating levels of insurgent
violence. In addition to conducting armed engagements, guerilla operations, and planting
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), neo-Taliban insurgents use civilians as targets and
as human shields in order to maximize collateral damage and combat pro-government
and pro-Western forces. In 2010, UNAMA reported a massive campaign of civilian
assassinations carried out by neo-Taliban insurgents as a major strategy to counter pro-
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government and NATO "surge" operations.227 UNAMA reports that in the southern
regions of Afghanistan,228 where insurgents are most active, civilian casualties totaled
2,777 in 2010, a 20 percent increase over 2009 civilian casualties. Deliberate civilian
assassinations and increased civilian casualties illustrate a ruthless campaign of tit-for-tat
reciprocity on the part of the neo-Taliban which aims to undermine the power of NATO
and government forces by turning the population against them.
Corruption and Ineptitude In the Afghan Government:
Arguably the most prominent political problem facing the legitimization of US
power and "thick" hegemony in Afghanistan is the corruption of state government. The
variable which best explains the rise of corruption and ineptitude in the Afghan
government is lack of US funding.229 However, even when there is funding for
reconstruction projects sponsored by the government, in most cases, the money provided
never reaches its intended target.230 Analysts who address corruption in the Afghan
government agree that external money is fueling the neo-Taliban insurgency and must be
stopped. However, proposals usually call for sweeping, extensive anti-corruption
measures to be implemented within government, police, and armed forces; the
prosecution of narcotics traffickers; and the promotion of a sense of government
legitimacy among local Afghans.231 Blanket statements calling for the confrontation of
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corruption and the improvement of competence and legitimacy of the national and local
Afghan government are all stymied by the fact that US relations with regional and
international actors are not robust enough to convince local populations that the United
States and the Afghan government are less corrupt and more efficient than their neoTaliban competitors.232
Seth Jones identifies two main motivations for why Afghan insurgents fight:
religion and government.

In some cases, Jones explains, insurgents were not recruited

because of their love of the Taliban but because of their hatred for the Afghan
government.234 According to a report by the Center for Strategies and International
Studies (CSIS), 42 percent of Afghans believe their country is heading in the wrong
direction due to governmental problems.235 The Taliban's rule during the 1990s made
many Afghans adverse to their brutal punishments and harsh laws. Afghans who wanted
to support the insurgency but had no religious or ideological motivations found different
reasons to fight. Those reasons are often validated by perceptions that their government is
corrupt, unrepresentative, and inept. According to polls, 12 percent of Afghans blame
violence in the country on the Afghan government.23 Corruption in government presents
both an ideational and material equilibrium problem for Afghan citizens. Corruption
causes disequilibrium in the form of poverty, widespread unemployment, and wealth at
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the material end and cultural and religious disequilibrium at the ideological end. Many
Afghan citizens feel that their government is a Western puppet, incapable of governing
anything more than major urban areas.

Afghans also have ideological reasons for

despising their government, which are grounded in ethnicity. The alienated Pashtun
communities in Southern and South-East Afghanistan are generalized as Taliban
sympathizers and largely absent from government posts.
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, written by Lt.
Colonel John A. Nagl, states that "a counterinsurgency effort cannot achieve lasting
success without the host nation government achieving legitimacy."239 The manual also
gives a set of six indicators with which to determine government "legitimacy. ,.240
Table 3 241
Indicators of Government Legitimacy According to the U.S. Army/Marine Corps
___^
Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
1. Ability to provide security for the populace.
2. Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a
substantial majority of the populace.
3. Culturally acceptable levels of corruption.
4. A high level of participation in or support for political processes.
5. A culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic and social development.
6. A high level of regime acceptance by major institutions.
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Unfortunately, Afghanistan's model of centralized government does not fulfill the
requirements of any of the indicators. The 2001 Bonn Agreement and 2004 Afghan
constitution paved the way for the establishment of a centralized government which
places "virtually all executive, legislative, and judicial authority in the national
government."242 The president appoints every significant official in the executive branch,
all security forces are national forces, and Kabul holds all policy, budgetary, and revenuegenerating authority.

The United States crafted its Afghanistan strategy on the

assumption that stability would be achieved by building a strong central government, a
long-term objective which insurgents effectively learned how to sabotage.244
Resentment for the Afghan national government is a breeding ground for
insurgency and a basis for its support. Taliban and neo-Taliban recruiters use the
frustration and disenfranchisement of local populations to "legitimize their actions and to
find human resources for recruitment. They not only capitalize on it, they instrumentahze
it by attempting or promising to attempt a recreation of the equilibrium, and to reinstall
'justice', or even a certain alternative regional or world order." 4 The Taliban insurgency,
therefore, views corruption and ineptitude in the Afghan government as justification for
counterbalancing actions. Finally, retaliation based on the logic of power equilibrium, in
the form of violence against NATO and ISAF forces, becomes the insurgency's method
of mimicking the balancing that is absent at the state level.24
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Almost all researchers agree that stable governance is an essential component for
defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan. Countless public officials pay lip service to the
947

necessity of implementing a strong government.

However, attempts to stem the de-

facto partition of Afghanistan's countryside by neo-Taliban insurgents are insufficient.
Jones describes the governance dilemma in Afghanistan according to Aesop's fable,
"Belling the Cat."
A group of mice called together a committee to consider how to protect
themselves from a cat that was harassing them. The best solution, one mouse
proposed, was to bell the cat, which was met with general applause. But this left
one key question: Who would put the bell around the cat's neck? 'This was a
question of implementation, since there were no volunteers, the policy was
useless.249
Sufficient implementation and support for Afghanistan's governmental institutions
is the Achilles' heel of US power in the region. Analysts recognize that the Afghan
government has not lived up to the model of centralized government established at Bonn
and in the Afghan constitution. The result is a government unable to provide key services
or protect the local population, especially in rural areas.250 Thus the government is
pegged as corrupt, inept, and unrepresentative of Afghanistan's rich ethnic and tribal
heritages. Ultimately, ineffectual governance in Afghanistan is a key variable which
motivates Taliban insurgents to fight. As the government loses further respect and
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control, civilians become more likely to fight their "disgusting government" both because
they detest it and because they fear the consequences of not fighting.251

251

Ibid.

CHAPTER TV

CONCLUSION
The Future of the neo-Taliban Insurgency In Afghanistan:
According to Seth Jones, Afghanistan's insurgency was caused by a supply of
disgruntled villagers unhappy with their government, and a demand for recruits by
ideologically motivated leaders. "Too little outside support for the Afghan government
and too much support for insurgents further undermined governance. This combination
proved deadly for the onset — and continuation ~ of the insurgency."252 Using Beyer's
synthetic approach, this analysis finds that the major factors leading to the neo-Taliban
insurgency in Afghanistan can be traced back to imbalances of ideational and material
power between the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. These imbalances prevented
the establishment of US "thick" hegemony and allowed the Taliban to remain a player in
the region as a legitimate "antihegemonic coalition." In order for the United States, its
allies, and the Afghan government to successfully withstand the neo-Taliban insurgency
in Afghanistan, several key areas of power imbalance must be addressed. This analysis
finds that there are three important power dynamics within the Afghan insurgency at the
global, state, and sub-state levels of analysis. These dynamics can be categorized as: (1)
the relationship between the United States, Pakistan, and the Afghan government, (2) the
relationship between the Afghan government, NATO forces and Afghan citizens, and (3)
the relationship between neo-Taliban insurgents, Afghan citizens, and pro-Western/progovernment forces. A synthetic analysis of the relationships among actors at all levels of
252
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the Afghan War reveals the significance of material and ideational power equilibrium at
all levels of international relations. The information provided by this analysis contributes
to a growing field of international relations theorists, scholars and policymakers who
argue that the United States must beat the Taliban at the local level by developing
comprehensive political solutions, not just military solutions.253
The Afghan War is both a war of material might and a war of ideas. The United
States must find a way to make its material power work in harmony with its ideational
power. The US possesses the military might to crush Taliban forces on the battlefield, but
its ability to do so is hampered by a corrupt domestic government and declining popular
opinion among Afghan citizens. Synthetic analysis of the Afghan insurgency shows that
the United States and the Afghan government have the material means to win the war but
lack the soft power and legitimacy to consistently win the "hearts and minds" of the
Afghan people. Comparison of key material factors indicates that although US spending
and troop levels have increased over time, Taliban insurgency levels and presence have
not consistently decreased or been eliminated. The inability of NATO forces to eliminate
Taliban influence in Afghanistan is not simply due to lack of funding or troop levels.
There is a severe lack of ideational soft power among NATO and Afghan government
forces that is undermining their efforts at the military level. Until an appropriate
equilibrium is reached at the ideational level, NATO and Afghan forces will not be able
to defeat the Taliban through military means. This is not to suggest that material or hard
power does not matter; training and developing the Afghan National Army and Police are
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pivotal to success in Afghanistan. However, placing too much burden on material means
without sufficient ideational backing is a serious mistake.
Table 4

Year

Key Indicators of neo-Taliban and U.S. Material Forces In Afghanistan.
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010

Number of US
forces in
Afghanistan 2 ' 4
Number of
neo-Taliban
insurgents in
Afghanistan 255
U.S.
Assistance to
Afghanistan
(USD
millions)256
Neo-Taliban
Presence in
Afghanistan *
(percent of
Afghan
provinces)

5,200

15,200

20,400

30,100

63,000

4,000

9,500

17,000

_

25,000

815

2,483

3,527

5.656

15,700

_

11%

47%

72%

97%

^
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Joseph Nye describes power in the 21st century as a three-dimensional chess
game:
On the top board of the three-dimensional game, the United States is the world's
only superpower. But if you go to the middle board, of economic relations
between states, there is already a balance of power. If you go to the bottom board
of transnational relations, problems cross borders outside the control of
governments, whether it's infectious diseases or drug smuggling or terrorism, no
one is in charge; power is chaotically organized or distributed.

Nye argues that while military power can be of some use occasionally on the bottom
board, more often than not you will need other forms of power, particularly soft power in
order to achieve your goals.259 Synthetic analysis of the neo-Taliban insurgency confirms
Nye's perspective. According to Nye, soft power is essential to be able to attract majority
of citizens to better opportunities, education, health care, justice, and dignity.260 The
United States will not prevail in Afghanistan until the neo-Taliban can no longer recruit
and radicalize Afghanistan's moderate citizens.

As of 2009, only 22 percent of Afghan

citizens say that the Taliban has popular support in their area.262 NATO and the Afghan
government must continue to attract the moderates and the majority of Afghans to their
cause in order to bolster their soft power in the fight against the neo-Taliban.
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Fighting On the "Ideational" Front: Can the United States, NATO and the Afghan
Government Gain Soft Power?
Table 5 263
Key Indicators of NATO and Afghan Government "soft power" Among Afghan Citizens
In 2009.
Afghans who blame the US, Afghan, or NATO forces for the
36%
country's violence.
Afghans who call the U.S.-led invasion and overthrow of the
69%
Taliban a good thing for their country.
Afghans who support the presence of the US military in
63%
Afghanistan.
Afghans who sec official corruption as a problem in their
85%
country.
Afghans who think the government will defeat the Taliban
33%
with foreign support.
Afghans who think the government is making progress in
59%
providing a better life for Afghans.
________
Nye argues that in order to increase its soft power, the United States must change
both the substance and style of its foreign policy.264 Ideally, restoring soft power can be
accomplished by reducing unilateralism and increasing government-to-government and
government-to-civilian cooperation.

The "with us or against us" approach of the Bush

administration's War on Terror put the future of the Taliban and Afghanistan in black and
white terms. The Taliban and al-Qaeda were the enemy and there would be no
compromise. However, as the layers of al-Qaeda influence and involvement are peeled
away from the Taliban, and researchers continue to develop an understanding of who the
Taliban are; analysts and policymakers are adjusting their outlook. On June 18th, 2011
President Karzai announced that the US is engaged in talks with the Taliban.266 In July

Data Source: Cordesman, "Afghan Public Opinion and the Afghan War."
Nye, "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics," 5.
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2011, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that there could be political talks with
the Taliban by the end of the year. The United Nations has also split a sanctions blacklist
for the Taliban and al-Qaeda, hoping to encourage the Taliban to join reconciliation
efforts and the political process.267
A revived political approach based on engaging "moderate" elements of the neoTaliban and reintegrating them into the political process provide NATO and the Afghan
government with a moderate amount of legitimacy and soft power. However, unilateral
actions by the United States based on inaccurate perceptions of power and world politics
continues to hinder progress at the second and third level dimensions of the Afghan War.
The US raid to kill Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, and relentless NATO air strikes show
that the United States still focuses on unilateral, military preeminence when it wants to
get a job done. This approach deteriorates relations between the United States, the
Afghan government, and Pakistan.268 In May of 2011, a NATO airstrike killed 12
children, prompting Karzai to issue a "last warning" to NATO to stop what he described
as "arbitrary" operations by foreign forces.269 Likewise, the killing of bin Laden made
previously tense relations between the United States and Pakistan appear even more
volatile.270
The deteriorating relations among major state actors in Afghanistan calls into
question the long-term stability of the power constellation that is developing in the
region. The political attitudes of Pakistan and the Afghan government are becoming
266
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increasingly volatile. As each actor continues to speak out against the other, condemning
unilateral actions and calling into question each other's unity of purpose; any prospects of
US ideational hegemony succeeding in Afghanistan look dimmer and dimmer. In reality,
the ideational powers of actors in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia are constantly being
contested. The United States is slowly coming to the realization that ideational hegemony
cannot be achieved in Afghanistan as long as its relations with Pakistan and the Afghan
government remain unstable. This instability is easily preyed upon by the Taliban
insurgency and provides them with motivation to continue their balancing tendencies
(both materially and ideationally) in order to gain an advantage over their regional rivals
and survive as a political movement.
In conclusion, the most important reason why the Taliban insurgency still exists
after ten years of war is the lack of "thick" hegemony in Afghanistan and the region
among state actors. The Taliban were not defeated in 2001, they simply reverted to their
mid 90s existence as a stateless, Islamic Fundamentalist movement. When they
reemerged from Pakistan's tribal areas, the Taliban were dubbed "neo-Taliban" by
researchers in an effort to understand their new insurgency tactics and illustrate the fact
that the Taliban had changed but also stayed the same in many ways. With a renewed
sense of insurgency and revolution, the Taliban began challenging the position and power
of the United States, Pakistan, and the newly formed Afghan government within the
region. The Taliban have proven that with or without control of the Afghan state, they
have garnered a position of ideational and material significance within regions of
Afghanistan and Pakistan that cannot be hindered using hearts and minds tactics, political
rhetoric, money, state borders, or military might. This analysis suggests that as long as
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ideational hegemony is not established among the United States, Pakistan, and the
Afghan government, the Taliban insurgency will continue to play a role within the unimultipolar power constellation of the region.
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